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a	 number	 of	 procedural	 and	 substantive	 competition	 law	 issues,	 including	 the	
substantive	 appraisal	 of	 vertical	 agreements.	 The	question	of	whether,	 and	 if	 so	how,	
analysis	 of	 vertical	 agreements	 under	 the	 competition	 laws	 of	 the	 AMSs	 should	 be	







AMSs	 should	 be	 reformed	 or	 developed	 to	 ensure	 a	 more	 coherent	 policy	 which	 is	
optimal	for	achieving	ASEAN’s	objectives.	One	issue	considered	is	whether	the	EU	policy	
towards	 resale	 price	 maintenance	 and	 restraints	 on	 cross-border	 trade	 should	 be	
emulated.	In	particular,	whether	a	hardline	approach	should	be	adopted	against	vertical	
restraints	which	enable	 firms	 to	partition	 the	ASEAN	market	 along	national	 lines	 and	
perpetuate	 price	 differences	 in	 the	 AMSs,	 thereby	 undermining	 its	 single	 market	
objective.	
	
The	paper	 concludes	 that	 although	greater	harmonisation	of	policies	 towards	vertical	
agreements	might	be	desirable,	it	will	be	difficult	to	achieve	within	the	existing	national	
systems	 without	 some	 legislative	 changes	 and	 significant	 cooperation	 between	 the	
ASEAN	 competition	 authorities.	 Given	 the	 different	 perspectives	 that	 the	 separate	
legislative	 regimes	 reflect,	 debate	will	 be	 required	 to	 build	 consensus	 around	 a	more	
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the ASEAN goal of harmonising national competition policies and laws, 
the ASEAN Member States (AMSs) adopt an array of different approaches towards a 
number of procedural and substantive competition law issues, including the 
substantive appraisal of vertical agreements.1 Although the question of whether, and if 
so how, analysis of vertical agreements under the competition laws of the AMSs 
should be aligned has, to date, received little attention from ASEAN competition 
agencies, it is matter of considerable importance. Not only do the differences in 
approach adopted undermine ASEAN’s stated objectives, but they create complexity 
for business, are likely to be making it difficult for business to exploit fully the 
advantages of the ASEAN single market and are creating error risks.2 This Chapter 
consequently considers whether, and if so how, the approach to vertical agreements 
under the competition law systems of the ASEAN states should be reformed to ensure 
a more coherent policy that is optimal for achieving the single market and other 
objectives envisaged by ASEAN. 
Section 2 commences by examining how the divergent national policies towards 
vertical agreements in the AMSs might be damaging competition, efficiency and 
market integration and why greater convergence around a harmonised framework 
might be desirable. Section 3 then goes on to analyse the rules and standards that have 
evolved to evaluate vertical restraints across the USA and EU under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act 18903 and Article 101 TFEU4 respectively, and the factors that have 
influenced the development of policy in these jurisdiction. It focuses, in particular, on 
the EU experience where the competition law rules are incorporated within the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),5 specifically to ensure that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted. 6 Indeed, a core objective of EU 
competition law has been to ensure that private businesses do not jeopardise the 
internal market project by re-erecting barriers to the free movement of goods and 
services that have been, or are being, dismantled at the State level.7 This goal has 
strongly influenced the policy towards vertical (and intellectual property (IP) 
licensing) agreements and partly explains why certain vertical restraints, particularly 
territorial ones, are treated with such hostility under EU competition law. 
Section 4 then considers what might be learnt from USA and EU law and how they 
might suggest an ASEAN policy could be developed to further the ASEAN objectives 
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1  See Chap. ***. 
2  In particular, the risk both that certain anticompetitive vertical practices are going unchecked in 
some AMSs and that a number of procompetitive arrangements across the ASEAN region are being 
deterred, see further section 2.  
3  Section 1 prohibits contracts etc found to be in ‘unreasonable’ restraint of trade, see Standard Oil 
221 US 1 (1911), 58-60. 
4  Article 101(1) prohibits agreements which have as their object or effect the restriction of 
competition, whilst Article 101(3) provides a legal exception, exempting agreements which meet its 
four criteria from the Article 101(1) prohibition see e.g., A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 6th edn, 2016), Chap. 3.  
5  See Protocol 27 (annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon) and e.g., Jones and Sufrin, ibid, Chap. 1. 
6  The single market pursued by ASEAN is different in style to the one pursued in the EU, see section 
2. 
7  See Chap. ***. 
and reflect the specific features and make up of those economies and their 
competition law systems. In particular, it considers how:  
(i) Specific rules or standards could be developed to assess vertical agreements. 
One issue considered is whether the EU policy towards restraints on cross-
border trade should be emulated, and a hardline approach adopted against 
vertical restraints which enable firms to partition the ASEAN market along 
national lines, thereby undermining its single market objective; and  
(ii) Substantive convergence and effective enforcement could be achieved in the 
‘ASEAN-way’ – within the different national frameworks (and in the absence 
of a supra-national and supreme ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
competition law system enforced by supranational institutions).  
Section 5 concludes that although greater harmonisation of policies towards vertical 
agreements might be desirable, it will be a challenge for it to be achieved within the 
existing national systems without some legislative changes and significant 
cooperation between the ASEAN competition authorities. Given the different 
perspectives that the separate legislative regimes reflect, debate will be required to 
build consensus around a more uniform approach that can effectively be implemented 
within each of the national systems.  
2. DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO VERTICAL AGREEMENTS IN THE ASEAN 
MEMBER STATES 
The AEC Blueprint sets out four key objectives: 8 (i) a single market and production 
base; (ii) a highly competitive economic region; (iii) a region of equitable economic 
development; and (iv) a region integrated into the global economy. Although it does 
not provide for supranational institutions but, rather, relies on cooperation to fulfil its 
goals, it nonetheless sets out an aspirational plan for deep regional integration which 
goes well beyond the elimination of border barriers to create a single market, 
‘encompassing also initiatives in trade facilitation (such as the alignment of 
standards), improving the climate for foreign investment, liberalizing services trade, 
and concluding new trade agreements with external partners’. 9 Indeed, one study has 
estimated that, given the scope and scale of the AEC ambition (and taking into 
account benefits resulting from the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures, 
trade facilitation, improvements in the investment climate and from extending 
ASEAN’s network of free trade agreements to other external partners), it is realistic to 
estimate gains of five per cent of ASEAN income resulting from full implementation 
of the plans.10  
A core focus of the blue print is the single market which envisages, in particular, 
eliminating and removing duties, restrictions and non-tariff barriers to ASEAN trade 
in goods and services and facilitating freer movement of skilled labour and capital 
(but not, as in the EU, a customs union nor free movement of persons and capital). 
Reducing tariffs, non-tariff and other barriers to trade between the AMSs has the 
potential to bring significant welfare benefits. Although some AMSs concentrate 
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8  See http://www.asean.org/storage/2016/03/AECBP_2025r_FINAL.pdf  and Chap. 1. 
9  P.A. Petri, M.G. Plummer and F. Zhai, ‘The ASEAN Economic Community: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis’ (2012) 26(2) Asian Economic Journal 193. 
10  ibid (‘The example of European integration suggests that a single market created through such 
initiatives not only generates gains from trade based on comparative advantage, but also gives rise 
to new horizontal trade based on economies of scale.’) 
more heavily on pursuing economic welfare benefits derived from investment 
facilitation that increases foreign direct investment (FDI) into the liberalizing AMSs, 
the advantages to be gained from eliminating intra-regional tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade should not be forgotten.11 Organic growth within ASEAN should, 
consequently, be a crucial aspect of the AEC project. 
In order to create a competitive economic region, to ensure a business friendly 
environment and to lower non-tariff barriers to trade, the blueprint envisages the 
introduction of effective rules on competition.12  The rules governing competition are 
considered necessary, in particular, to guarantee a level playing field and ‘fair 
competition’ for firms, improved market access and to allow ASEAN to achieve its 
objective of becoming a stable, competitive, innovative and dynamic region in the 
world, which is an attractive region for FDI.13  
To ensure a level playing field and access to the different ASEAN national markets is 
ensured, it seems crucial that the AMSs’ competition laws can reach and prohibit 
vertical agreements, which have the potential to harm competition and efficiency, 
inhibit competitors’ access to the market (for example, through exclusive dealing 
arrangements which prohibit customers’ from purchasing from other firms) and/or to 
prevent dealers from selling across borders to reach customers in other AMSs. 
Because, however, vertical agreements also have the potential to achieve efficiency in 
distribution and may facilitate penetration of new markets, however, care needs to be 
exercised in developing competition law rules to ensure that the mixed competitive 
effects of these agreements are taken into account and that procompetitive 
arrangements are not deterred. 
A number of strategic measures have been identified in the competition sphere in 
order to achieve ASEAN’s objectives,14 including narrowing distinctions between 
national competition policies and laws and cooperation to ensure effective dealing 
with cross-border commercial transactions.15 These goals are reflected broadly, in the 
ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy. 16  However, although the 
Guidelines on Competition Policy suggest that AMSs should ‘consider prohibiting 
horizontal and vertical agreements between undertakings that prevent, distort or 
restrict competition in the AMSs’ territory’,17 they say nothing about how the legality 
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11  ibid, section 3. 
12  Other actions are also envisaged to achieve a competitive economic region including measures to 
develop plans and/or harmonise rules relating to e-commerce, consumer protection, intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), taxation and infrastucture. 
13  See also n. 11 and text. 
14  See Chap. 1. 
15  ‘A unique regional competition law seems too ambitious a goal for ASEAN …, not only because of 
legal differences in the AMS but also given the disparities in size, economic weight, and level of 
industrialization among AMS.’ B Valockova, ‘EU Competition Law: A Roadmap for ASEAN?’ 
EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper no 25, November 2015, 9. 
16  Available at http://www.icao.int/sustainability/Compendium/Documents/ASEAN/ASEAN-
RegionalGudelinesonCompetitionPolicy.pdf. See also Guidelines on Developing Core 
Competencies in Competition Policy and Law, available at http://www.asean-
competition.org/file/post_image/Regional%20Core%20Competencies.pdf. 
17  Guidelines on Competition Policy, ibid, section 3.2 (they identify distribution, agency and 
franchising agreements as examples of vertical agreements). 
of vertical agreements should be evaluated and there has been relatively little focus on 
how these overarching aims can be achieved in relation to vertical agreements. Rather 
this type of harmonization and cooperation does not appear, so far, to be emerging. 
On the contrary, a spectrum of radically different approaches towards vertical 
agreements currently exist that undermine ASEAN’s ambition of narrowing major 
distinctions in competition laws and reducing costs on business. In Singapore and 
Brunei, for example, the competition rules generally only reach vertical agreements 
concluded by dominant firms (vertical agreements are excluded from the antitrust 
laws governing restrictive agreements).18 In Indonesia and Malaysia, in contrast, 
certain vertical practices, including resale price maintenance (RPM),19 are treated 
with acute suspicion. In the other jurisdictions the approach to vertical agreements is 
less rigid, but the question of whether and if so how the rules apply to vertical 
agreements is not always clearly spelt out in the legislation or, yet, in jurisprudence, 
creating considerable uncertainty for firms; a clear analytical framework for 
examining such arrangements is not emerging.  
These divergences seem to reflect different underpinning philosophies, which are 
likely to be impeding or inhibiting firms from developing and implementing ASEAN-
wide distribution strategies. In addition, the categorical approach to vertical 
agreements adopted in some of the jurisdictions, and/or the failure to enforce the rules 
and elucidate the law in others, creates a lack of clarity and a risk of errors which may 
be inhibiting competition and deterring business from taking full advantage of the 
single market. In particular: 
1. Overly draconian rules against, or unclear rules applicable to, vertical agreements 
may be deterring the conclusion and operation of agreements which provide 
substantial scope for efficiencies and the development by suppliers of new 
markets in other AMSs 20  (and consequently with the potential to increase 
competition and market integration).21 Distribution agreements are frequently 
adopted with the aim of aligning the contracting parties’ interests, minimising 
distribution costs, of ensuring efficient and effective distribution arrangements, 
and, consequently, of enhancing sales of the supplier’s product. In short, their 
ambition may be to bring a product or service to market in the most efficient 
manner by allowing the parties, for example, to solve a free-rider problem (to 
prevent free-riding on the provision by a dealer of services so inducing optimal 
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18  In Singapore, for example, all vertical agreements are excluded from the scope of the Competition 
Act section 34 prohibition, see Third Schedule para. 8. Although this decision was taken on the 
premise that vertical agreements have procompetitive effects that more than outweigh the potential 
anticompetitive effects, the Act recognises that there may be situations where this is not the case. If 
so, the Minister for Trade and Industry (“the Minister”) may, by order, specify that the section 34 
prohibition shall apply to such a vertical agreement.  
19  See e.g., The Law of Republic of Indonesia Number 5 Year 1999 Concerning Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Practices, (Law No 5/1999), Art 8 (see also the 
treatment of tying, Art 15(2)), Malaysian Competition Act 2010, s 4 and Malaysian Competition 
Commission (MyCC)’s Guidelines on the Enforcement of the Chapter I prohibition (stating that it 
will take a strong stance against RPM). See also Thailand’s Trade Competition Act, s 27. 
20  See e.g., the European Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (Vertical Guidelines) 
[2010] OJ C130/10, paras. 6, 104-107, L. Telser, ‘Why Should Manufacturer’s Want Fair Trade?’ 
(1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 8 and W.S. Comanor, ‘Vertical Price-fixing, Vertical Market 
Restraints, and the New Antitrust Policy’ (1984–1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 983. 
21  See further Section 3. 
service provision), to open up and enter new geographic markets (by inducing a 
distributor to engaging in sufficient investment), to create a quality brand image, 
to develop a manufacturer’s product, to protect a manufacturer’s know-how, to 
enable a manufacturer to exploit economies of scale in distribution and/or to deal 
with capital imperfections.  
2. Conversely, as most vertical agreements are out of the reach of the Singaporean 
and Bruneian competition authorities (unless concluded by a dominant firm), there 
is a risk that anticompetitive vertical agreements in these jurisdictions may be 
going unchecked. The fact that vertical restraints might provide positive effects 
does not mean that their imposition is always justified and that such restraints will 
inevitably result in distributive efficiency. Rather, economists are generally 
unwilling ‘to make sweeping generalisations’ and to regard them ‘as per 
se beneficial for competition’22 because of the risk that some restraints23 may, in 
certain circumstances, facilitate collusion between suppliers and/or dealers or 
foreclose other suppliers or buyers by raising barriers to entry or expansion. 
Vertical restraints may also create obstacles to market integration by imposing 
limitations on the possibilities for consumers to purchase goods or services from 
wherever they choose.24 
If greater convergence were to occur, two crucial questions are: (i) which, if any, of 
the spectrum of approaches adopted amongst the ASEAN states approach, would be 
the best to utilise to develop an effective competition policy in ASEAN?; and (ii) how 
could greater convergence be achieved in the existing ASEAN framework, 
comprising separate national competition law regimes enforced solely at the national 
level? These issues are considered in section 4 once the approaches that have evolved 
in the US and EU respectively, and their rationales, have been assessed.  
3. ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL AGREEMENTS IN THE US AND THE EU 
A.  Rules and Standards 
In the section above it is seen that vertical agreements have the potential, depending 
on the environment, to produce both anti- and procompetitive effects. In determining 
how to analyse vertical (and other) agreements under competition laws, an important 
question is how to balance accuracy (based on widely accepted economic principles) 
with administrability, consistency, objectivity and transparency,25 and whether to 
apply more complex standards26 (requiring detailed analysis of the conduct at issue in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM(96) 
721, para. 54.  
23  Particularly, resale price maintenance (RPM) and territorial restraints, see further section 3. For a 
full discussion of the treatment of RPM and territorial restraints in the US and EU respectively, see 
e.g., B. Jedličková, Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Territorial Restrictions: Theory and 
Practie in EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar, 2016). 
24  See especially the Vertical Guidelines, para. 100. 
25  See, e.g., OECD Policy Roundtables: Resale Price Maintenance (2008), available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/43835526.pdf>. 
26  Conducting such a detailed assessment in every case is likely to impose too high a burden on firms, 
competition agencies (and other claimants) and courts, creating a risk both that procompetitive 
agreements will be deterred and too little enforcement/condemnation of harmful agreements will 
occur, see e.g., M. Bennett," A. Fletcher, E. Giovannetti and D. Stallibrass,"  ‘Resale Price 
Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy’ 
the legal and economic context in which it occurs), or simpler bright line rules27 
(which are easier and less costly to apply by decision-takers and business, provide 
greater clarity and legal certainty than more amorphous standards, but, generally, 
create greater risk of error). Many antitrust systems accept that agreements should be 
sorted into categories for different types of antitrust appraisal. For example, they may: 
• Apply, for procedural economy reasons, rules or presumptions against 
agreements that are very likely to cause anticompetitive effects and are unlikely to 
have offsetting benefits. Such agreements, identified through economic consensus 
or following practical experience of their effects, may be prohibited ‘per se’ (an 
absolute prohibition, as in the US) or be presumed to be incompatible with the 
competition law rules unless the parties can demonstrate otherwise (as is the case 
for ‘object’ restraints in the EU); 
• Apply rules or presumptions in favour of agreements which are very unlikely to 
cause anticompetitive effects—in some systems (including the EU), such 
agreements may benefit from a safe harbour; and 
• Reserve more detailed, multi-faceted and complex analysis for agreements whose 
effects are more ambiguous and which consequently require closer individual 
scrutiny of the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects (described as a ‘rule of 
reason’ analysis in the US or an effects based analysis in the EU (conducted under 
Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) respectively)).  
A controversial issue is when, and how often, each category should be utilised. 
B.  A Move Away from Categorical Analysis in the US 
i. The Rise of the Rule of Reason 
In the US, since it has been accepted that the Sherman Act pursues a consumer 
welfare objective28 there has been a concern that categories of antitrust analysis 
adopted when interpreting section 1 Sherman Act should not become conclusions, 
displacing the fact-specific analysis in which antitrust law is supposed to be 
engaging.29 Indeed, because of the difficulties and contradictions that can arise from 
categorical analysis, the line between the per se rule and the rule of reason, utilised in 
determining whether an agreement is in unreasonable restraint of trade, has become 
increasingly blurred. Not only have the circumstances in which the rule of per se 
illegality applies been dramatically narrowed, but recognizing the inherent 
uncertainties, difficulties and cost involved in full (or plenary) rule of reason analysis, 
‘intermediate’ categories of analysis have been developed or discussed as alternative 
methods of examining the competitive significance of any contract. The courts have 
backed away from the two fixed categories towards a continuum.  
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(2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1278, 1281-1282. This may be a particular concern 
for ASEAN, see section 4 below. 
27  It is necessary to consider whether an approach which may sometimes condemn legitimate business 
practices (false positives or ‘Type 1’ errors) and so potentially chill procompetitive conduct is a 
lesser or greater evil than one which may sometimes allow anticompetitive practices to escape 
antitrust prohibitions (false negatives or ‘Type 2’ errors). 
28  In both Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 US 330, 343 (1979) and NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. 
of Okla., 468 US 85 (1984), the Supreme Court accepted that the Sherman Act is designed as a 
‘consumer welfare prescription.’  
29  M.A. Lemley and C.R. Leslie, ‘Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence’ (2008) 93 Iowa 
Law Review 1207. 
Rather than focusing upon the category to which a particular restraint should be 
assigned, . . .  the essential inquiry is “whether . . . the challenged restraint enhances 
competition.”. . . In order to make that determination, a court must make “an enquiry 
meet for the case, looking to the circumstance, details, and logic of the restraint,” . . . 
which in some cases may not require a full-blown market analysis.30 
There has, therefore, been a sea change - a shift from substantial reliance on rules 
based on form to more nuanced standards grounded in economics and away from a 
‘dichotomous approach—under which every restraint of trade is either unlawful per 
se and not susceptible to justification, or subject to full-blown rule-of-reason 
analysis—toward one in which the extent of the inquiry is tailored to the suspect 
conduct in each case’.31 
This transformation has had a significant impact on the antitrust analysis conducted in 
relation to vertical agreements. In a series of landmark cases dealing with vertical 
intra-brand restraints, restraints which restrict competition between distributors of a 
particular supplier’s brand,32 !Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, 33  State Oil v 
Khan, 34  and Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc v PSKS, Inc (Leegin), 35  the 
Supreme Court stressed that as: 
(i) per se rules are appropriate only for manifestly anticompetitive conduct – 
agreements having, or likely to have, a ‘pernicious effect on competition’ and 
which are lacking ‘any redeeming virtue’; and  
(ii) the market impact of vertical intra-brand restrictions are complex because of 
their ability simultaneously to reduce intra-brand competition and to stimulate 
inter-brand competition - the primary concern of antitrust law36 - and to bring 
about distribution efficiencies; 
any anticompetitive effects resulting from such a restraint should be analysed under 
the rule of reason.37 For example, the majority of the Supreme Court in Leegin 
concluded that because the economics literature was ‘replete’ with procompetitive 
justifications for a manufacture’s use of RPM, the per se rule, which is confined to 
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30  Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission 416 F.3d 29, 35 (DC Cir. 2005). 
31  Ibid, 33–34. 
32  They may be price restraints (e.g., fixing the minimum or maximum prices at which the distributor 
can sell the products) or non-price restraints (e.g., limiting competition between distributors by 
requiring them to sell from a specified location, by granting distributors exclusive sales territories, 
by imposing restraints on the area within which, or the customers to whom, a distributor can resell 
the contract product or by limiting the type or number of outlets in which the supplier's products are 
sold). Frequently, such restraints may be accompanied by obligations on distributors to make 
specific services available to customers or to engage in active promotion of the products. 
33  433 US 36 (1977). Exclusive dealing arrangements, in contrast, have always been analysed under 
the rule of reason, see Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 365 US 320 (1961) 
34  522 US 3 (1997). 
35  551 US 887 (2007). 
36  ibid, fn. 19. 
37  To determine whether it ‘is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition’, Board of Trade of the City of 
Chicago v. United States 246 US 231, 238–39 
restraints that always, or almost always, tend to restrict competition and decrease 
competition, should not be applied.38  
Rule of reason analysis in the US requires, as its starting point, the plaintiff (or 
claimant) to establish that the restraint or agreement has had, or is likely to have, 
substantially adverse,39 or significant,40  anticompetitive effects.41 Only if this is done 
does the burden pass to the defendant to prove that the restraint or agreement 
achieves, or is likely to achieve, procompetitive benefits, in particular, the creation of 
efficiencies in the operation of a market or the provision of goods and services. If 
established, then it falls to the plaintiff to show either that: the conduct is not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the stated object (there are reasonably less restrictive 
alternatives); or the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive effects for 
which the restraint is reasonably necessary. 
ii.  Challenges  
An acute concern with the US rule of reason framework is that it does not make it 
easy for courts to ‘separate the beneficial sheep from the antitrust goats’.42 Although 
courts have sought to give its amorphous form greater structure, a fear is that, as well 
as creating uncertainty for firms seeking to comply with it, it creates significant 
barriers for claimants (especially ‘private claimants’) who have to discharge the initial 
burden of demonstrating that an agreement has had, or is likely to have, substantial 
anticompetitive effects;43  
‘it has become something of a commonplace that rule of reason antitrust 
violations are almost impossible to prove, particularly in private plaintiff 
actions’.44  
The challenge therefore is for trial courts to create a litigation structure which makes 
‘rule of reason analysis’ transparent to business and workable so that anticompetitive 
restraints can be identified and eliminated under it (thereby ensuring that vertical 
practices, including RPM, are not de facto legalised). As Justice Kennedy stated in 
Leegin courts can ‘devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions 
where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit 
anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.’45 Given, however, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38  Tying is now the only vertical restraint that is treated with greater suspicion. This conduct is 
analysed under an ‘atypical’ form of the per se rule which only applies if certain conditions are 
satisfied (including proof of market power in the tying product market), see Jefferson Parish 
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US 2, 27 (1984). 
39  United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 338 US 365 (1967) (overruled in Slyvania on other 
grounds). 
40  United States v. Topco Associates 405 US 596, 606 (1972). 
41  The inquiry focuses on allocative efficiency, whether or not the agreement has or will enable or 
facilitate the exercise of market power. 
42  See Justice Breyer, in Leegin 551 US 887 (2007).  
43  Complaints about vertical agreements are likely to be struck out by a court at an early stage of the 
proceedings, if market shares are not sufficiently high to indicate that the defendant(s) has market 
power and so is able to act anticompetitively and to injure competition, see n. 109 and text. 
44  H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Harvard, 2005), 8.  
45  Justice Kennedy in Leegin 551 US 877 (2007). He considered that three factors should be 
particularly important to the inquiry in RPM cases: (1) the number of manufactures making use of 
the practice; (2) the source of the restraint (harm to competition would be more likely to arise if 
that relatively few vertical cases reach final judgment on the substance, a clear picture 
of how the litigation structure works is not emerging. In particular, as the federal 
antitrust agencies have not brought vertical cases under section 1 in recent years, they 
have become rather disengaged from policy making in this sphere.  
C.  Brighter Line Rules in the EU 
i.  Background 
The approach in the US, contrasts starkly with that existing in the EU. In the EU less 
emphasis in vertical cases is placed on conducting a full effects analysis and greater 
reliance is placed on brighter line rules: in the form of both presumptions of illegality 
and legality. This position has resulted from two core factors/ historic features of the 
system explored in greater detail in sections ii-iv below:  
• First, the interpretation given to the concept of a ‘restriction’ of competition 
within the meaning of Article 101(1), influenced by ordoliberal46 (in the past at 
least) and single market47 ideals, has resulted in a relatively broad category of 
vertical agreements being found to restrict competition within the meaning of 
Article 101(1) – including some which are assumed to restrict competition. 
Agreements infringing Article 101(1) are prohibited unless excepted from the 
prohibition by Article 101(3); 
• Second, the broad construal of Article 101(1), combined with the enforcement 
system that existed pre-2004 under which the Commission had the exclusive right 
to grant exemption under Article 101(3), created the pressing need for group 
‘exemptions’, exempting categories of agreements from the Article 101(1) 
prohibition. Although the Commission’s exclusive right to adjudicate individually 
on Article 101(3) has been removed and the Commission has sought to modernise 
and rationalise the interpretation of Article 101(1) against the backdrop of a 
consumer welfare objective,48 block exemptions still remain a core feature of the 
EU system and operate as a ‘safe harbour’ for a swathe of vertical agreements.  
ii.  Restrictions of Competition by Object: Agreements that are 
Presumptively Illegal? 
Article 101(1) prohibits an agreement if either its object or its effect is to restrict 
competition. An agreement whose object or precise purpose49 ‘reveals in itself a 
sufficient degree of harm to competition law’,50 or a ‘sufficiently deleterious impact 
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RPM were introduced as a result of retailer pressure); and (3) whether the manufacturer or retailer 
has market power. See also speech of then Assistant Attorney General C. Varney, Antitrust 
Federalism: Enhancing Federal/State Cooperation, Columbia Law School State Attorneys General 
Program, 7 October 2009. 
46  See n. 70 and text. 
47  See further section 3.D. 
48  C.E. Mosso, ‘The Contribution of Merger Control to the Definition of Harm to Competition’, 
GCLC Conference, Brussels, February 2016, 4 ‘This more economic approach was essentially 
about taking better account of market power in the assessment of a given practice. That meant 
recognising that some vertical restraints were no longer hardcore (for example passive sales into 
another distributor's territory), and that non-block-exempted vertical restraints should be assessed in 
light of the parties' market power on their respective markets’. 
49  Taking account of its clauses and the legal and economic context in which it operates, Case C-
501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (GSK) v. Commission, [2009] ECR I-9291, para. 58. 
50  Case C-67/13P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires  v. Commission EU:C:2014:2204, para. 57 
on competition’,51 is assumed to restrict competition and to infringe Article 101(1); no 
assessment of anticompetitive effects is required or permitted (whether to prove or 
disprove the existence of actual restrictive effects).52 Only if the object of the 
agreement is not found to restrict competition is it necessary to consider whether that 
is its effect. 
An established line of cases make it clear that, although not concluded between 
competitors but providers of complementary goods and services, a category of 
vertical agreements are ordinarily53 considered to be restrictive of competition by 
object,54 including those which: 
• involve price fixing (RPM);55  
• confer absolute territorial protection (ATP) on a distributor (or otherwise aimed at 
partitioning national markets or limiting parallel trade);56 or  
• ban online selling (which reduces the ability of a distributor to sell outside its 
territory, see Pierre Fabre57); 
Even though, the Court has consistently stressed in its case-law that the object of an 
agreement can be identified only through an analysis of both its content and the 
economic and legal context in which it operates it has not, save for in the most 
exceptional circumstances,58 been willing to accept that the overarching objective 
pursued by an agreement incorporating such severe restraints is not to restrict 
competition. Rather, as is illustrated by the case of Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. & 
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission (Consten and Grundig),59 in these cases the 
Court tends to focus on the restraints imposed and simply assumes that they are 
disproportionate to any objective pursued and that their object is to divide the internal 
market on territorial lines and to restrict competition. In this case the Court of Justice 
thus rejected the parties’ argument that the vertical sole distributorship agreement, 
incorporating clauses which sheltered the exclusive distributor from all intra-brand 
competition in France and conferring ATP upon it, was necessary to prevent 
freeriding and to encourage competition between similar products of different makes 
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51  Case 56/65, STM [1966] ECR 235, 249. 
52  Case C-286/13 P, Dole EU:C:2015:184, paras. 111–135, Case C-8/08, T-Mobile [2009] ECR I-
4529, para. 31. 
53  See n. 58 and text. 
54  The category of object restraints is not closed, see n. 114 and text. 
55  See n. 97 and text. 
56  See e.g., COMP/28.282, The Distillers Company Ltd [1978] OJ L50/16, Case 30/78, Distillers 
Company v. Commission [1980] ECR 2229, COMP/30.228, Distillers Company plc (Red Label) 
[1983] OJ C245/3; Case T-77/92, Parker Pen v. Commission [1994] ECR II-549 COMP/35.918, 
JCB [2002] OJ L69/1, this aspect of the decision upheld, Case T-67/01, JCB Service v. Commission 
[2004] ECR II-49, aff’d Case C-167/04 P, JCB Service v. Commission [2006] ECR I-8935,  
COMP/37.975, Yamaha 16 July 2003 and COMP/36.623, 36.820 and COMP/37.725, Peugeot 
[2005] OJ L173/49, aff’d (but fine reduced) Case T-450/05, Peugeot v. Commission [2009] ECR II-
2533. 
57  Case C-439/09, EU:C:2011:277, see n. 104 and text. 
58  See e.g., Case 27/87, Erauw-Jacquéry Sprl v. La Hesbignonne Société Coopérative [1988] ECR 
1919, Case 62/79, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films (Coditel I) [1980] ECR 881. 
59  Cases 56 and 58/64, [1966] ECR 299. See also, e.g., Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services 
Unlimited v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, para. 61. 
(inter-brand competition). Instead, focussing on the mechanism the parties adopted to 
achieve their objective – the isolation of the French market – the Court held that 
clauses which result in the segregation of a national market, and/or in maintaining 
separate national markets, were liable to have as their object the restriction of 
competition. 
Although agreements incorporating object restraints are not illegal per se, they are 
strongly discouraged. Indeed, the Commission states that they are presumed not to 
satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3)60 and to be incompatible with Article 101 (the 
Commission equates object restraints with ‘hardcore’ restraints identified in its block 
exemptions and guidelines and which prevent the safe harbour of the block exemption 
from applying). Parties to such agreements thus face an uphill and uncertain struggle 
to establish that such individual agreements meet the Article 101(3) criteria even if 
they perceive them to be helpful, or even indispensable, to the efficient distribution of 
their products or services. As (i) there is little guidance as to when agreements 
incorporating object restraints may satisfy the Article 101(3) criteria in practice,61 (ii) 
it is unclear how benefits raised under Article 101(3) can be weighed against 
anticompetitive effects which have only been assumed and not established under 
Article 101(1), and (iii) serious consequences frequently follow where a competition 
agency uncovers agreements incorporating object restrictions, parties perceive these 
restraints to be prohibited and risky and generally seek to avoid using them. The 
Commission (see for example VW,62 Nintendo63 and Yamaha,64 JCB,65 Volkswagen66 
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60  The Commission’s view is that provisions so severely restricting rivalry between firms are unlikely 
to satisfy the terms of Article 101(3) because agreements of this nature (a) generally fail to create 
objective economic benefits, (b) do not benefit consumers and/ or (c) are unlikely to be considered 
indispensable to the attainment of any efficiencies created by the agreement in question 
(efficiencies generated can generally be achieved by less restrictive means). See e.g., Guidelines on 
the application of Article 81(3) [now 101(3)] [2004] OJ C 101/97, paras 46, 79, 105. 
61  Indeed a flurry of non-infringement decisions providing clear guidance on the application of Article 
101(3) to agreements incorporating ‘object’ restraints seems most unlikely. Not only are NCAs not 
permitted to adopt non-infringement decisions, (see Case C-375/09, Tele2Polska [2011] ECR I-
3055) but it seems improbable that the Commission will wish, or be able, to dedicate resources to 
adopting this kind of decision. In practice therefore NCAs may deal with RPM and ATP which they 
consider to be ‘unproblematic’ from a competition perspective by deciding not to prioritise it for 
enforcement. 
62  COMP/35.733, Volkswagen [1998] OJ L124/60, Case T-62/98, Volkswagen AG v. Commission 
[2000] ECR II-2707 (fine reduced), aff’d Case C-338/00 P, Volkswagen AG v. Commission [2003] 
ECR I-9189. 
63  COMP/35.706 and 36.321, [2003] OJ L255/33, aff’d (but fines reduced), Case T-12/03, Itochu v. 
Commission [2009] ECR II-909 and Case T-13/03, Nintendo and Nintendo of Europe v. 
Commission [2009] ECR II-975, Case C-260/09 P, Activision Blizzard Germany GmbH v. 
Commission EU:C:2011:62. See also COMP/39.154, Apple/iTunes 18 March 2008. 
64  COMP/37.975, Yamaha 16 July 2003. 
65  COMP/35.918, [2002] OJ L691, annulled on appeal, Case T-67/01, JCB Service v. Commission 
[2004] ECR II-49, para. 130 (this finding was not challenged before the Court of Justice, which 
broadly upheld the judgment of the GC, Case C-167/04 P, JCB Service v. Commission [2006] ECR 
I-8935). 
66  COMP/36.693, [2001] OJ L262/14 (imposing a fine of €30.96 million on Volkswagen), annulled 
on appeal Case T-208/01, Volkswagen v. Commission [2003] ECR II-5141, aff’d Case C-74/04 P, 
[2006] ECR I-6585, aff’d Case C-74/04 P, [2006] ECR I-6585 
and Peugeot67), as well as some National Competition Authorities of the EUMSs 
(NCAs), have fined firms that incorporate price, territorial restraints or other restraints 
on online selling within their distribution agreements.  
iii.  Other Agreements: Effects Analysis and Safe Harbours 
Where the object of an agreement is not to restrict competition it will not infringe 
Article 101(1) unless demonstrated to have appreciable restrictive effects. Some 
judgments of the EU courts, for example, the CJ’s judgment in Delimitis,68 support 
the view that the Article 101(1) inquiry must focus on the important question whether 
or not the agreement, alone or in conjunction with a network of similar agreements, 
would be likely to have an appreciable impact on the parameters of competition and 
allow the parties to exercise market power through a restriction of inter-brand 
competition.69 In this case the Court, when setting out guidance for a national court as 
to how to assess the compatibility with Article 101(1) of a beer supply agreement 
obliging a café proprietor to purchase most of its beer requirements from the brewer, 
stressed the importance of assessing whether the agreement appreciably contributed to 
a foreclosure of access to the market. This required the relevant market to be defined 
and an assessment made of whether there was a concrete possibility for new 
competitors to penetrate the market or existing competitors to expand.  
In other cases, involving restraints on intra-brand competition, weight has been 
attached to the importance of the structure of competition and undistorted competition 
in all market segments (including the distributor level)70 and the wider objective of 
achieving an integrated internal market. This case-law reflects a suspicion of 
restraints on rivalry between a supplier’s dealers and a concern that they might limit 
cross-border trade and perpetuate price differences in the EU Member States 
(EUMS). Consequently, many vertical intra-brand restraints even if not restrictive by 
object have been deemed to restrict competition unless necessary:  
• to facilitate the penetration of a new market by an undertaking through the 
prevention of free riding on a dealer’s marketing and promotion efforts (see, for 
example, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (STM);71  
• to encourage non-price competition between dealers (see, for example, Metro-SB-
Grossmärkte GmbH v Commission (Metro 1)72); or  
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67  See COMP/36.623, 36.820, and 37.275, Peugeot [2006] OJ L173/20.. 
68  Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935.  
69  This judgment provides support for the Commission’s conclusion that in order to establish whether 
an agreement has a restrictive effect on competition it is necessary to determine if it affects inter-
brand competition i.e., that it affects ‘actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the 
relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods and 
services can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability’ and, its promise to adopt an 
economic approach in its application of Article 101 and focus its inquiry on the market power of the 
undertakings concerned. 
70  They thus appear to attach importance of the process of competition as a mechanism not simply for 
achieving consumer welfare and efficiency, but for ensuring the freedom to conduct a business and 
equal and undistorted access to the market which will result in variety and safeguard consumer 
choice, see e.g., P. Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of “Abuse” of a Dominant Position and its 
Impact on Article 102 TFEU’ in P. Nihoul and I. Takahashi, Abuse Regulation in Competition Law, 
Proceedings of the 10th ASCOLA Conference (2015). 
71  Case 56/65, [1966] ECR 235. 
72  Case 26/76, [1977] ECR 1875, para. 21. 
• to the commercial success of a franchise agreement (Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v 
Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis (Pronputia)73).  
This analysis is not so easy to fit within what is conventionally considered to be an 
antitrust effects analysis, involving an inquiry as to whether the agreement affects 
‘actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the relevant market negative 
effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods and services 
can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability’.74 Rather, the Court tends to 
assume that restraints on the dealer’s conduct in the agreement are restrictive of 
competition unless objectively necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim.75 As 
this methodology does not set out clear criteria for determining objective necessity, or 
require any ‘identification of how far the … measure impacts upon intra or inter-
brand competition’, it seems to frustrate ‘the more economics-based revolution in 
antitrust’.76 It also fuels the lack of clarity as to how effects analysis is to be 
conducted and, consequently, the need for safe harbours that side-steps it. 
Firms are likely, therefore, where possible to seek to circumvent the need for Article 
101(1) (and Article 101(3)) analysis and ensure the compatibility of their agreements 
with Article 101 by relying on one of two safe harbours that exist:  
a) Agreements that are concluded between undertakings which have a weak position 
in the market and which do not incorporate ‘object’ restrictions,77 fall outside of 
the scope of Article 101(1) where their impact on competition is de minimis  (they 
do not have a significant, or appreciable, effect on competition (the restriction on 
competition is de minimis).78 In the context of vertical agreements, the doctrine is 
likely to apply to firms whose market shares do not exceed fifteen per cent;79 or 
b) Agreements that are concluded between parties whose market shares do not 
exceed thirty per cent and which do not contain ‘hardcore’ restraints (specified in 
the block exemption itself) may benefit from the Verticals block exemption (the 
Verticals Regulation). The benefit of this Regulation, which is directly applicable, 
can only be withdrawn prospectively.80 Consequently, it operates as an important 
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73  Case 161/84, [1986] ECR 353. 
74   Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [now Article 101(3)] of the Treaty (the Article 101(3) 
Guidelines) [2004] OJ C101/97, para. 24. This could be because the agreement restricts actual or 
potential competition between the parties or between any one of the parties and third parties that 
could have existed absent the agreement, paras. 25-26.  
75  Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353, para. 15. 
76  G. Monti, ‘Restraints on Selective Distribution Agreements’ (2013) 36 World Competition 489. 
77  Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v. Authorité de la concurrence EU:C:2012:795. Because of the 
uncertainty surrounding the question of what constitutes an object restraint, the Competition 
Directorate of the Commission (DGComp) published a Staff Working Document on restrictions of 
competition by object, SWD(2014) 198 final. 
78  Case 5/69, Völk v. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295. 
79  Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), 
C(2014) 4136 final. 
80  Reg. 1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1, Arts 29(1)(2) and Reg. 330/2010 [2010] OJ L, recital 15 (see also Art. 
6). Where the block exemption appears to exempt an agreement which is problematic, the 
Commission or NCA have to withdraw its benefit from the agreement which is valid and 
compatible until then (consequently no infringement decision of fine for breach is possible). 
mechanism for authorising a large group of vertical agreements whose efficiencies 
are presumed to offset any anticompetitive effects.  
iv. Challenges 
Although the system that has developed under Article 101 provides considerable legal 
certainty to firms entering into vertical agreements, problems do nonetheless arise 
from it. Not only does it create error risks – in particular the strict stance against 
‘object’ and ‘hard-core’ restraints creates a possibility of that agreements designed to 
ensure efficient distribution across the EU will be deterred (Type I errors)81 – but it 
means that relatively few cases exist in which a full effects based analysis of a vertical 
agreement is conducted. Rather, because most competition agency decisions 82 
involving vertical agreements have involved object infringements83 and firms will 
where possible seek to rely on the safe harbour of the block exemption, guidance is 
limited on the question of how it is determined whether a vertical agreement has as its 
effect the appreciable restriction of competition and/ or whether the agreement 
satisfies the four conditions of Article 101(3). In particular it is unclear when 
concerns manifest in the jurisprudence about restraints on rivalry and internal market 
integration, prevail over analysis based on an assessment of the impact of the conduct 
on economic efficiency and the welfare of consumers in the EU.  
The lack of a clear framework for assessment has been particularly problematic as 
cases have arisen in relation to new vertical models of distribution emerging on online 
markets and platforms. Many of these practices are not dealt with in detail in the 
Commission’s Vertical Guidelines and a clear picture is not emerging as to how EU 
competition law governs them. Although, a number of NCAs have scrutinised these 
types of agreement (for example the use of most favoured national clauses (MFNs)84 
in contracts between hotels and online travel agents (‘OTA’s, including Hotel 
Reservation Service (‘HRS’), Booking.com and Expedia)85), the Commission has 
only more recently started to take a keen interest in online distribution arrangements, 
focusing on those which may be preventing cross-border e-commerce in the EU.86 
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81  The application of the broad Verticals block exemption could in exceptional circumstances 
authorise anticompetitive agreements (unless and until withdrawn), see n. 80. 
82  As the Commission has not adopted a vertical decision since 2005 (COMP/36.623, 36.820, and 
37.275, Peugeot [2006] OJ L173/20) recent cases have mainly been occurring at the national level 
(the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO), in particular, has been active in enforcement in this 
area). 
83  And since the notification and exemption procedure was abolished, no non-infringement decisions 
have been adopted. 
84  Obliging hotels to commit not to offer lower rates or better conditions/ availability either itself, or 
on other platforms, to those offered on the OTA’s platform. 
85  These were examined by a number of NCAs which struggled to act consistently. For example, the 
German NCA (the Bundeskartellamt, or Federal Cartel Office) adopted decisions finding both that 
HRS’ and Booking.com’s MFNs infringed competition law (both German and EU), continuing 
proceedings against the latter, even after other NCAs, including the French, Italian, and Swedish 
authorities, ended proceedings by accepting commitments from Booking.com, coordinated within 
the forum of the ECN, see generally N Varona and A Hernadez Canales, ‘Online Hotel Booking’, 
CPI Antitrust Chronicle May 2015. 
86  The Commission is in the process both of conducting an e-commerce sector inquiry C(2015) 3026 
final and investigating geo-blocking practices, that is whether restrictions preventing cross-border 
access to online pay-TV services, or satellite pay-TV services, incorporated in agreements 
D.  Rationale: Policy Underpinning the US and EU Approaches 
The question of how vertical restraints should be analysed under antitrust laws has 
provoked significant debate and controversy in both the US and the EU. The different 
approaches adopted in each jurisdiction reflect the disparate evolution of the 
respective rules and differing views as to how to achieve their objectives and whether 
false positives or negatives are a lesser evil. 
In the US the question of how vertical restraints should be appraised under section 1 
Sherman Act has had a ‘tumultuous history’.87  Hovenkamp notes: 
Few areas of antitrust law have provoked more reconsideration of established rules, 
or more disagreement between courts and commentators, than vertical price and 
nonprice restraints. Like all practices, they can be governed by three possible legal 
rules:  per se illegality, rule of reason analysis, or per se legality. Unlike most other 
practices, however, in this area serious arguments have been made for all three 
positions.88  
Although the restraints such agreements imposed on the freedom of individual traders 
led the courts initially to take a hostile and inflexible view of them, subjecting many 
to a per se rule of illegality, it has been seen that all but tying89 are now subject to rule 
of reason analysis. Their potential for procompetitive effect has persuaded the 
Supreme Court that per se prohibition is not appropriate, even for restraints which 
severely limit intra-brand competition. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn long established precedents has not, 
however occurred entirely without controversy. Some commentators have been wary 
about the introduction of rule of reason analysis, particularly in relation to minimum 
RPM, and as to whether it may allow some anticompetitive vertical agreements to go 
unchecked (creating a risk of under-inclusive rules or ‘Type 2’ errors). They have 
pointed to evidence establishing that the free rider justification raised by the parties in 
these cases is often exaggerated, that RPM, and some other non-price intra-brand 
restraints, may encourage provision of an excessive and wasteful level of services 
leading to harm to infra-marginal consumers,90 may be used to facilitate, encourage 
and/or allow collusion (explicit or tacit) between retailers or manufacturers, leads to a 
rise in consumer prices, weakens interbrand competition, eliminates innovative and 
dynamic competition from discounting retailers  and/or might be used to ‘appease 
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concluded between US film studios and EU pay-TV broadcasters infringe Article 101, Hollywood 
Studios, IP/04/1314.  
87  F.M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd edn.,) 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 541. 
88  H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The law of competition and its practice (West, 3rd ed, 
2005), 447. 
89  See n. 38 and text. 
90  The ‘marginal consumer’, whose valuation of a product approximates to its current price, is 
sensitive to improvements leading to an increase in the market price of a product. He or she will 
purchase more of the product only if he considers that the improvement in service or quality of the 
product is worth the increase in its price. In contrast ‘infra-marginal consumers’ are consumers that 
place a value on the product substantially higher than the original price. Such consumers are 
relatively insensitive to increases in price. They will, therefore, not refrain from purchasing the 
product on an increase in price even if, in their view, the improvement in the quality of the products 
did not merit that increase in price, see W. Comanor ‘Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical market 
Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy 98 Harv LR 983 (1984-1985) 
dealer interests in excess profits or the quiet life’.91  Indeed, in Leegin Justice Breyer, 
writing for the dissenting minority, noted that US history provided empirical support 
for the view that RPM led to higher retail prices92 and that economists generally 
concurred on this point.93 In contrast, he found no satisfactory answer to the question 
as to when, and how often, benefits such as the prevention of free-riding, were likely 
to occur94 and considered that courts would have extreme difficulty in identifying 
instances in which benefits were likely to outweigh harm in rule of reason analysis.  
In the EU, the Commission is also concerned that RPM may restrict competition in a 
number of different ways, in particular:95 through facilitating collusion between 
suppliers and enhancing price transparency; by eliminating intra-brand price 
competition; by softening competition between suppliers and/or retailers; by 
preventing distributors from lowering sale prices; by lowering pressure on 
manufacturers’ margins; by foreclosing competitors; and by reducing dynamism and 
innovation at the distribution level. For this reason it has concluded that RPM 
provisions restrict competition by object and are prohibited unless efficiencies are 
demonstrated by the parties. The Court has affirmed that although price competition 
‘does not constitute the only effective form of competition or that to which absolute 
priority must in all circumstances be afforded’,96 a complete elimination of price 
competition between dealers is restrictive of competition by object.97 It is therefore 
concerned about severe restraints on intra-brand competition irrespective of the 
intensity of inter-brand competition on the market.  
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91  For discussion see e.g., P. Areeda and H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Applications 35 (2004), B. Jullien and P. Rey, Resale Price Maintenance and 
Collusion (2000), P. Rey and T. Vergé, Resale Price Maintenance and Horizontal Cartel (2004), F. 
M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd edn) 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 550, M-L. Allain and C. Chambolle, Anticompetitive Effects of Resale-
Below Cost Laws (2007), Comanor ibid and T.R. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic 
Theories and Empirical Evidence (Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics staff report, 
Nov. 1983) (this report indicated that the more widespread practice of RPM in Europe delayed the 
arrival of supermarkets). 
92  Justice Breyer stated that after the repeal of the Fair Trade Acts in the US (permitting RPM in many 
states), price surveys conducted by FTC staff indicated that RPM had in most cases increased the 
prices of products sold with RPM, Bureau of Economic Staff Report to the FTC, T. Overstreet, 
‘Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence’, 169 (1983), 551 US 877, 
912 (2007). 
93  See, e.g., F.H. Easterbrook, ‘Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason’ (1984) 53 Antitrust 
Law Journal 135 (‘There is no such thing as a free lunch; the manufacturers can’t get the dealer to 
do more without increasing the dealer’s margin’); and amici curiae brief filed by 37 states 
supporting the respondent before the Supreme Court in Leegin. 
94  ‘All this is to say that the ultimate question is not whether, but how much, “free riding” of this sort 
take place. And, after reading the briefs, I must answer that question with an uncertain 
“sometimes”’, 551 US 877, 916 (2007). 
95  Vertical Guidelines, para. 224. 
96  Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH v. Commission (Metro 1) [1977] ECR 1875, para. 21.  
97  See especially, Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353, para. 25 
(‘provisions which impair the franchisee’s freedom to determine his own prices are restrictive of 
competition’), Case 26/76, Metro-SB ibid (‘price competition is so important that it can never be 
eliminated’) and Case 243/83, SA Binon & Cie v. SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse 1985] 
ECR 2015, para. 44 (‘provisions which fix the prices to be observed in contracts with third parties 
constitute, of themselves, a restriction on competition within the meaning of Article [101(1)]’). 
In the EU a hardline approach is also taken towards territorial restraints which shelter 
a distributor from all intra-brand competition and lead to the division of national 
markets. The Commission’s vision is that eliminating these types of obstacle to free 
movement is necessary to achieve the maximum possible level of integration and that:  
removal of non-tariff barriers is not sufficient for the full development of parallel 
trade, arbitrage and changes in distribution across Europe. For the complete success 
of economic integration it is necessary that producers, distributors and consumers, 
find it profitable to move towards the new market situation and not take actions to 
avoid or counteract the effects of the Single Market measures. The elimination of 
barriers to trade may not achieve its objective if producers and/or distributors 
introduce practices contrary to integration.98 
The Commission is extremely concerned about the significant costs of not realising 
the EU’s single market objectives; this goal thus ‘adds an extra dimension to the 
analysis of vertical restraints’.99 The Commission’s view is that companies should not 
be allowed to recreate private barriers between Member States where State barriers 
have been successfully abolished or to seal off territories ‘hermetically . . . , making 
interpenetration of national markets impossible, thereby bringing to nought economic 
integration’.100  
For the complete success of economic integration it is necessary that producers, 
distributors and consumers, find it profitable to move towards the new market 
situation and do not take actions to avoid or counteract the effects of the Single 
Market measures. The elimination of barriers to trade may not achieve its objectives 
if producers and/or distributors introduce practices contrary to integration. 
Unfortunately in many cases it is likely that they have strong incentives to do so.101 
Again, the case-law affirms and has generally sought to ensure that some avenues for 
parallel trade remain open. Vertical arrangements must not frustrate the EU objective 
of achieving the integration of national markets through the establishment of a single 
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98  European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 
COM(96)721, para. 78. 
99  ibid, 70. (‘The 1992 programme was the result of a widely held conviction that the failure to 
achieve a single market has been costing European industry millions in unnecessary costs and lost 
opportunities. The exact title of the Cecchini Report, ‘The cost of Non-Europe’ … is a clear 
reflection of this. … Now that more steps have been taken to eliminate the remaining obstacles to 
the free movement of goods, services and factors of production, it is still apparent that further 
efforts are necessary to achieve the maximum possible level of integration …The EC experience 
shows that the removal of non-tariff barriers is not sufficient for the full development of parallel 
trade, arbitrage and changes in distribution across Europe..). See also Z Patki, The Cost of non-
Europe in the single Market: Cecchini Revisited An overview of the potential economic gains from 
further completion of the European Single Market CoNE 1/2014 European Parliamentary Research 
Service (Report estimating the costs arising from the lack of full achievement of the Single Market 
as a result of gaps and shortcomings in the areas of free movement of goods, the free movement of 
services, public procurement, the digital economy and consumer acquis). 
100  Ninetendo [2004] OJ L255/33, para. 338. See also R. Wesseling, ‘The Modernisation of EC 
Antitrust Law’ (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 48–49 (‘Initially… [t]he antitrust rules were not 
more than private counterpart to the rules, enshrined in Articles 28-20 EC [the rules on free 
movement of goods]. The framers of the Treaty wanted to preclude private undertakings replacing 
the prohibited public obstacles to inter-state trade. The first period … saw the Commission 
enforcing the rules with constant reference to ensuring the free flow of goods, thus promoting 
market integration.’ 
101  European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 
COM(96)721, para. 70. 
market. Thus ‘in principle, agreements aimed at prohibiting or limiting parallel trade 
have as their object the prevention of competition’.102 
In addition, in Pierre Fabre v Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence,103 the Court 
of Justice clarified that ‘the promotion of online sales is extremely important for the 
internal market in Europe because it broadens the market, improves the choices for 
customers, and generally speaking, enhances competition’. 104  Generally, every 
distributor should be allowed to use the internet to sell its products. Online selling 
constitutes a form of passive (not active) selling which can be restricted only in 
exceptional circumstances.105 
4.  AN APPROACH FOR ASEAN 
A. Substantive Analysis: Developing a uniform antitrust analysis 
The discussion above illustrates how section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 
have been applied to vertical agreements in the US and EU respectively. The 
approaches have been influenced by a number of factors, including the objectives 
underpinning the rules, debate over how best to achieve the objectives and the 
enforcement frameworks. A few general points emerge, however, which might be 
useful in considering how a more unified framework can be developed throughout the 
AMS.  
First, although some vertical restraints may be especially problematic when 
incorporated in agreements with dominant firms (for example, exclusive dealing 
provisions), US and EU experience, and an established body of literature, suggests 
that vertical agreements do have the potential to produce anticompetitive effects even 
when concluded by firms which are not dominant. Were all ASEAN jurisdictions to 
exclude vertical agreements from their competition rules governing restrictive 
agreements (as is the case in Singapore and Brunei), there would consequently seem 
to be a severe risk that the systems would not be flexible enough to reach all 
potentially problematic vertical arrangements, capable of harming competition 
through for example, facilitating collusion on markets (especially oligopolistic 
ones),106 foreclosing competitors and/or the penetration of new markets. Penetration 
of new markets, especially in other AMSs, may help businesses to reach new 
consumers and benefit from scale economies.  
Second, if vertical agreements are to be appraised under competition laws governing 
anticompetitive agreements, a framework within which consistent and greater 
uniformity of analysis can be conducted needs to be developed. The US and EU offer 
two quite different visions as to how that framework might be constructed – the 
former suggests that given their ambiguous effects flexible rule of reason analysis is 
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102  Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (GSK) v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, 
para. 59. 
103  Case C-439/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:277. 
104  ‘Interview with Dr. Alexander Italianer, Director General for Competition, European Commission’ 
theantitrustsource April 2011, 1, 6, Vertical Guidelines, paras. 52-54 
105  See also the e-commerce sector inquiry, n. 86. 
106  This may be a particular problem in small market economies, if tight oligopolistic markets exist 
which might be particularly prone to collusion and may make it hard for new competitors to 
penetrate markets.  
most appropriate whilst the latter relies more heavily on presumptions, reserving full 
individual Article 101 analysis for cases where the presumptions do not apply.  
Third, a full and open-textured rule of reason analysis is notoriously amorphous and 
difficult, complex and uncertain to apply, even if limited to purely economic 
considerations focussing on the competitive significance of the restraint107 and even in 
a jurisdiction with more than 120 years’ experience in applying antitrust laws.  In the 
US rule of reason cases are a daunting prospect for plaintiffs and all involved even 
though the Courts have sought to develop structure for it, for example, by: (i) devising 
short cuts to avoid full and costly analysis where anticompetitive effects are obvious 
(truncated analysis108) or where anticompetitive effects are most unlikely (through 
dismissal of the case);109 and (ii) by developing intermediate categories of appraisal110 
in other cases – ‘an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, 
and logic of a restraint.’111 
Reliance on rule of reason as the central mechanism of examination of all vertical 
agreements in the AMSs might, therefore, unless carefully structured and described in 
comprehensive guidelines, lead to uncertainty for business (and infringement risk) 
and disparate approaches by the different decision-takers (especially given the 
different policy objectives underpinning the separate national regimes). This would be 
likely to impose too great a burden both on ASEAN enforcement agencies (seeking to 
enforce them) and firms (seeking to comply with them). Further, there might be 
under-enforcement, 112  especially in AMSs with relatively new competition law 
systems where enforcers may be building experience!and!knowledge!and/or!have 
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107  See e.g., F.H. Easterbrook, ‘The Limits of Antitrust’ (1984) 63 Tex L Rev 1, 12, T Calvani, ‘Some 
Thoughts on the Rule of Reason’ (2001) ECLR 201. 
108  As a plaintiff’s task in proving anticompetitive harm through indirect evidence (by establishing the 
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition) involves a demonstration of market power and 
a showing that the agreement will create, increase or protect the market power of the parties, or 
facilitate its exercise and is extremely onerous, the courts have applied truncated analysis, a 
presumption of anticompetitive effects, in relation to obvious restraints where anticompetitive 
effects are apparent following a ‘quick look’ (General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing 
Association 744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1984), Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) or where ‘an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets’, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade 
Commission 526 US 756, 770 (1999). Actual or potential anticompetitive effects do not need to be 
demonstrated in the absence of a plausible justification being raised by the defendant 
109  For example, where an insufficient degree of market power is established, some courts have used 
market share (as a proxy for market power) as a mechanism for ‘filtering-out’ unmeritorious claims, 
see e.g., MA Patterson, ‘The Role of Power in the Rule of Reason’ 68 Antitrust Law Journal 429 
(2000). In e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (DC Cir 1986) Judge 
Bork suggested that where a defendant’s share of the market was small (in that case only around 
6% nationwide), that fact could be taken as indication that market power was lacking and, 
consequently, that it could not act anticompetitively so as to injure competition. See also Valley 
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982.  
110  ‘The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 
‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.’ 526 US 756, 779 (1999). 
111  526 US 756, 781 (1999) (‘The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so 
clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction 
will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one’).  
112  See n. 26. 
other higher priorities (such as cartel and merger investigations) pressing on their 
scare resources.  
Fourth, in order to provide greater legal certainty, consistency and administrability, 
serious consideration should be given to the question of whether application of 
(rebuttable) presumptions of illegality might be appropriate and/or whether safe 
harbours should be provided. Thus questions for reflection include: 
(a) should any presumptions of illegality be applied and, if so, which vertical 
agreements should be considered to be sufficiently deleterious so as to justify 
reliance on any such presumption? In particular:  
• is a presumption against RPM sufficiently grounded in economics and/ or 
justified by experience in the AMSs113 to date (the different perspectives 
adopted by the US Supreme Court and the EU authorities on this issue 
have been seen)?;  
• should a presumption of illegality be applied in relation to territorial 
restraints, and other restraints preventing selling across borders, as a 
helpful, or necessary, mechanism for achieving ASEAN’s market 
integration objective and countering attempts by firms to introduce 
practices contrary to it and to erect private barriers to trade?; and/or 
• should a presumption of illegality be applied to any other vertical 
restraint? Should there be a fixed list114 of restraints presumed to be 
incompatible with competition law and, if not, how are the parameters of 
the category to be determined?  
In making this decision, a crucial consideration is also how any applicable 
presumption can be rebutted. An absolute or per se rule against conduct is more 
contentious to apply than a presumption which is rebuttable. In the EU, it is 
frequently argued that the object category can justifiably be applied more broadly 
than the per se rule in the US, as unlike a finding of per se illegality (which does 
not allow any justifications for the conduct to be raised – there is a conclusive 
presumption of unreasonableness), a finding that an agreement is restrictive of 
competition by object does not prevent an argument that the agreement satisfies the 
conditions of Article 101(3). It has been seen, however, that there are difficulties 
with this perspective, in particular as a perception has been built that object 
restrictions are most unlikely to satisfy the four stringent conditions of Article 
101(3). The Commission has equated object restrictions with a list of hardcore 
restraints which it considers are both presumed to violate Article 101(1) and 
presumed not to satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3). Further, agreements have 
frequently been found to infringe Article 101 even where it has been vociferously 
argued by parties that the restraints at issue were necessary to enable a supplier to 
penetrate a new national market, prevent free-riding and so increase competition, 
consumer choice and market integration. The EU system is thus argued to be too 
rigid in this regard. If, in contrast, the burden on the defendant for rebutting a 
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113  RPM might, for example, be liable to result in acute problems in oligopolistic markets in AMS and 
facilitate collusion between dealers or suppliers operating on them, see n. 106. 
114  In the EU, the category of object restraints is not fixed but includes all agreements whose content 
and context reveal in themselves a sufficient degree of harm to competition law. An important issue 
which has consequently arisen is whether the category might encompass some ‘newer’ vertical 
business practices, in particular ones which may resemble RPM such as price relationship 
agreements, contracts that reference rivals or most favoured nation clauses (MFNs). 
presumption of illegality was less onerous and, if on proof of a procompetitive 
justification, account was taken of the relative actual or likely anticompetitive 
effects of the arrangement in the assessment, the scope of the object category, and 
the presumption of illegality that follows from its application, might not be quite so 
contentious.  
An extremely important issue, therefore, is how rebuttal of any presumption of 
illegality can be accommodated within the legal system of each AMS. Because of 
the propensity of all vertical agreements to produce efficiencies, it would seem 
inappropriate to apply absolute rules against them. Rather there should be credible 
opportunities for defendants to justify their arrangements and, where a 
justification is raised, a realistic framework for balancing the anti- and 
procompetitive aspects of the agreement. 
(b) Should safe-harbours be applied, for example, for arrangements concluded 
between firms with low markets shares and where, consequently, it is unlikely that 
the parties will have sufficient market power to harm competition on the market? 
In the US, courts are likely to dismiss complaints where anticompetitive effects 
are improbable, frequently because the defendant(s) lacks market power.115 In the 
EU it has been seen both that the de minimis principle and the block exemption 
regulations may operate as safe harbours where certain conditions, including 
market share thresholds, are satisfied, but only where the agreement does not 
contain object or hardcore restraints. The benefit of the Verticals Regulation can, 
however, be withdrawn prospectively (by the Commission or an NCA) where it 
can be demonstrated that the agreement does in fact infringe Article 101 – perhaps 
because the arrangements facilitate collusion at the supplier or retailer level.116  
Fifth, it is vital that coherent guidance be provided not only as to when presumptions/ 
safe harbours apply and can be rebutted or withdrawn, but as to how the law applies 
in situations where such presumptions/ safe-harbours are not applicable – where fuller 
‘rule of reason’ style or effects analysis is to be conducted. This could be achieved 
through ensuring that national legislation provides sufficient clarity, guidance is 
issued and both are supplemented by reasoned decision-taking (by competition 
agencies and/or courts) illustrating how individual analysis in relation to different 
types of vertical agreement is structured. Effective enforcement is essential to ensure 
that application of the law is clarified.  
B.  Achieving Convergence and Effective Enforcement of the Harmonised 
Framework 
Even if consensus around an appropriate approach for ASEAN can be settled on and 
articulated (perhaps in fleshed out Guidelines on Vertical Restraints which are more 
specific than the general regional guidelines on competition policy), a challenge will 
be to achieve that objective in the ASEAN way.  
In the EU effective enforcement and significant consistency in approach in the 
application of EU, and national, competition law has been achieved principally as a 
result of the principles of direct effect and supremacy of EU law. EU’s unique legal 
system means that Articles 101 and 102 have direct effect in each Member State - 
they bind not only the States, but private individuals without implementation in the 
national system. These rules can thus be enforced publicly by a network of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 See n. 109 and text. 
116 See n. 80 and text. 
competition agencies (the Commission and NCAs) and privately by the national 
courts. A degree of consistency in approach between the disparate decision-takers 
(Commission, NCAs and national courts) is ensured as the ultimate interpreter of the 
Treaties (and Articles 101 and 102) is the Court of Justice. National courts and NCAs 
thus apply EU law taking heed of the case-law of the EU Courts and giving it 
precedence over conflicting national law.117 Although NCAs are now playing an 
increasingly important role in the enforcement process, especially in the area of 
vertical restraints, if national enforcement leaves gaps, or creates uncertainty or an 
unacceptable risk of conflicting interpretations of EU law, the Commission can 
intervene in a case and deprive NCAs of jurisdiction over the matter.118 
Further, although NCAs and national courts can apply their own national competition 
laws concurrently with Article 101,119 they must also apply EU law to conduct which 
affects trade between Member States. The principle of supremacy demands that EU 
law prevail over any conflicting national law. As national authorities cannot rely on 
national law either to authorise conduct prohibited by Article 101 or to prohibit 
conduct authorised by Article 101, a high level of convergence between EU and 
national law governing agreements is demanded.120  
In ASEAN, in contrast, there is no supra-national law or enforcement agency and only 
national enforcement of distinct systems of national competition law, set within 
countries with diverse economic conditions. Convergence can thus be achieved only 
through cooperation and consensus building. A quick glance at the legislation 
governing vertical agreements in the ASEAN jurisdictions illustrates achieving 
greater uniformity of approach will not be easy: some have competition regimes 
modelled to different extents on EU or US law, others have regimes with fair trade or 
other socio-political elements mixed in;121 some, but not all, specify object or per se 
infringements; some, but not all, provide for exemptions or exclusions from main 
prohibitions; some, but not all, operate a notification system; and all of the 
jurisdictions have different social, economic, political and industrial makeups which 
make accord taxing. More specifically in relation to vertical agreements, it has been 
seen that some regimes treat vertical agreements by non-dominant firms as legal per 
se, some treat agreements containing certain vertical restraints as illegal per se and 
others shed little light on how it applies to vertical agreements. In order to achieve 
convergence around an agreed framework and greater clarity changes to primary 
legislation are thus likely to be desirable in at least a few of the individual AMSs.122  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117  Article 267 TEFU provides a mechanism for national courts and tribunals to refer questions to the 
Court of Justice where the interpretation of EU law is unclear. 
118  Reg. 1/2003, Art 11(6). 
119  The EU has exclusive competence over competition law only in so far as it is necessary for the 
establishment of an internal market (TFEU, Art 3(1)(b)). Exclusive competence means that only the 
EU may legislate and adopt legally binding acts unless it empowers Member States to do so (see 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), Art 2(1)). 
120  Reg 1/2003, Art 3. Even though many Member States have national competition laws which mirror 
EU law, and which are interpreted in line with them, these requirements minimse the risk of 
conflict. Broadly national law may deviate from the principles set out in Article 101 only in relation 
to conduct which does not affect trade between Member States. 
121  See Chap. ***. 
122  Eg, Singapore and Brunei would need to remove the exclusion for vertical agreements from laws 
governing anticompetitive agreements so bringing them within the scope of the law. The Guidelines 
In addition, depending on the exact approach around which consensus is built, in each 
jurisdiction it will need to be considered whether, and if so how: 
(i) Presumptions of illegality can be applied within the national framework. This 
is likely to be relatively straightforward for ASEAN regimes that utilise 
wording similar to the EU prohibition, referring to agreements which restrict 
competition by object or effect.123 Further, although at first sight the per se/ 
rule of reason dichotomy utilised in the US does not seem to allow for 
presumptions to be applied (rather conduct is prohibited per se or analysed 
more fully under the rule of reason), in practice US courts have used 
presumptions and burden shifting within the rule of reason framework. 
Truncated analysis (for cases displaying obvious anticompetitive effects) has 
not, however, been used by US courts to date in vertical cases, but only in 
certain horizontal collaboration cases.124  
(ii) (Any) presumptions of illegality can be rebutted. It has been seen that if 
presumptions are to be applied in vertical restraint cases, there should be 
realistic opportunities for firms to rebut them; otherwise the conclusion of 
procompetitive agreements may be deterred. Further, that a problem with the 
Article 101 structure is that it is very difficult for firms to justify agreements 
found to be restrictive of competition by object under Article 101(3). Many 
AMSs have the power to grant exemptions, and it will be interesting to see 
whether and if so how these are exercised.125 In others, however, (such as 
Indonesia and Lao) there is no or limited opportunity for exemption.126 Unless 
greater scope for exemption is provided for in these latter jurisdictions, 
application of presumptions may result in the utilisation of over-inclusive 
rules and Type 1 errors.  
(iii) Safe harbours can be applied. The application of safe harbours may be a 
useful mechanism for ensuring that a cluster of vertical agreements which are 
likely to be unproblematic from a competition perspective generally fall 
outside of the scope of the rules. Their use seems to be possible in a number of 
ASEAN jurisdictions which provide either for the adoption of block 
exemptions,127 the application of appreciability or de minimis principles128 or 
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on Developing Core Competencies in Competition Policy and Law, n. 16, envision that the 
evolution of a competition enforcement system will require a period of significant statutory 
revisions, based on experience acquired, to overcome its limits and shortcomings, see Part 1.3. 
123  See e.g., Singapore (although vertical restraints are currently excluded, see n. 18) and Malaysia 
Competition Act, Chapter 1 prohibition, section 4 (the Guidance states that RPM is likely to be 
found anticompetitive and that the MyCC will take a strong stance against it)  
124  See n. 108 and text. Courts have perhaps been reluctant to rely on quick look analysis or 
demonstrated actual effects in the context of vertical agreements because of the potential of such 
agreements to restrict output in the short term with the objective of increasing it in the long term 
125  See e.g., Singapore (net economic benefit test), Malaysian Competition Act 1910, s 5 and Myanmar 
Competition Law, 24 February 2015, s 15. 
126  See e.g., Indonesian Law No 5/1999, Art 50. 
127  See e.g., Singapore and Malaysia. 
128  See e.g., Malaysia where only agreements which significantly restrict competition on a market in 
Malaysia are caught (which have a non-trivial impact). Non-price vertical agreements may be 
considered to have an insignificant effect if the individual market share of the seller or buyer does 
not exceed 25% of their relevant market (See Guidelines on the Enforcement of the Chapter I 
prohibition, paras. 3.3, 3.4 and 3.17) and Singapore. 
for the exclusion of certain vertical agreements where the parties market 
shares do not exceed specified thresholds. Where such techniques are not 
available, mechanisms could be developed in the jurisprudence for authorising 
agreements or summarily dismissing or rejecting cases where the parties’ 
market shares are not sufficient to create competition law problems on the 
market.  
(iv) Guidance and clarity of policy can be developed. Reasoned decision-taking is 
a crucial mechanism for clarifying the law and for elucidating how a coherent 
framework for analysis is to be structured and developed in cases where 
presumptions do not apply and/or how presumptions are to be rebutted. For 
example, how proof of actual or likely anticompetitive effects and a theory of 
harm can be established in relation to specific type of restraint sufficient to 
shift the evidential burden to the defendant, what efficiencies or benefits can 
be relied upon to counter a prima-facie finding of anticompetitive effects and 
how the competing effects can be balanced or weighed against each other. As 
a number of the AMSs operate notification systems (for example, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Viet Nam and Thailand) there is scope for these authorities to adopt 
both infringement and non-infringement decisions and so to decide cases 
which will operate as essential guidance in future cases.  
(v) Competition agencies: cooperation and coordination. An ASEAN 
Competition Network and/or the ASEAN Experts Group for Competition 
could provide a forum in which to develop policy consensus, ensure 
uniformity in interpretation (in so far as feasible), to deal with cross-border 
matters and to ensure that conduct in one AMS which harms competition in 
another129 or infringes ASEAN objectives (for example, where an agreement 
in one AMS prevents the parties from selling into another) does not go 
unchecked. The EU model demonstrates that it is not always easy or possible 
to achieve consistency within a network of competition authorities even where 
there is a central competition law, active cooperation between the authorities 
and where they are applying the same law. Regular meetings between 
agencies to facilitate a coordinated approach will therefore be necessary and to 
ensure cooperation and information sharing in cases with cross-border 
effects.130  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The AMSs currently adopt divergent policies towards vertical agreements which may 
be creating both enforcement gaps which allow anticompetitive agreements to go 
unchecked and uncertainty which is deterring the conclusion of some procompetitive 
distribution arrangements. Pursuing a more consistent policy might help both to deter 
anticompetitive distribution arrangements and encourage pursuit of efficient 
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129  In addition to the question of how one AMS will enforce its law against businesses in another 
AMS, the jurisdictional reach of each of the AMS’s competition laws will thus be important (see 
e.g., the Singapore Competition Act, section 35, which gives the Commission explicit extra-
territorial jurisdiction in relation to conduct which harms competition in Singapore). In the EU, an 
important issue is whether a ‘qualified effects’ doctrine should be adopted; that is, Articles 101 and 
102 should apply where conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable consequences 
within the EU. The Court of Justice has so far not had to rule on this issue, but the question has 
been raised directly before it in Intel, Case C-413/14P, appeal from the General Court’s judgment in 
Case T-286/09, EU:T:2014:547.  
130  See further Chap. ***. 
distribution practices which would benefit welfare, facilitate market integration and 
allow businesses to adopt more uniform distribution policies throughout the AMS. 
This may promote competition and help to realise the benefits from increased trade 
between AMSs. 
Achieving greater harmonisation will require acceptance that the process will help 
achieve ASEANs goals (particularly the single market objective), commitment and 
close cooperation between agencies to ensure coordination and elucidation of policies 
within their legislative frameworks, as well as mechanisms to achieve consistent 
application of the law and collaboration in individual cases, especially those with 
cross-border effects. This will require extensive work, not least to agree on a 
consistent policy to pursue, which may demand legislative amendments in some 
AMSs. This paper has, drawing on the enforcement experience of the US and the EU, 
and seeking to avoid some difficulties experienced in those jurisdictions, set out some 
proposals about how thinking could be developed to achieve consensus around 
development of a single policy within ASEAN. It requires close consideration of a 
number of issues, particularly how lessons learnt from the US and EU can be used to 
mould a coherent and clearly articulated policy which is optimal to achieve ASEAN 
objectives and which can be implemented effectively in each AMS.    
